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tion of the site. On the first issue, the court determined the ICO's five
individual members had standing because they established the requisite injury-in-fact by showing the inability to use the river for recreational purposes and the direct health risk concerns due to the river
pollution. The court further ruled the injury fairly traceable to and
redressable by Honeywell. In addition, the court ruled ICO established
associational standing because ICO's members otherwise had standing, the interests of danger to public health and environment were
germane to ICO's purpose, and the claim and injunctive relief did not
require the individual participation of ICO's individual members.
On the second issue, the court determined clear error existed
where the district court held Honeywell to a higher standard than required by RCRA. Specifically the district court added four additional
requirements to the statute. Although the district court clearly erred
in adding the four additional requirements to RCRA, the court determined no merit to Honeywell's argument and no reason to disturb the
district court's endangerment ruling. The court reasoned the district
court's ruling had merit because on the basis of the evidence present
and continuing pathways for exposure endangered both human health
and the environment.
Finally, the court determined none of the district court's findings
on injunctive relief were clearly erroneous within the meaning of
RCRA and upheld the decision of the district court. The court thus
affirmed the decision of the district court on all counts.
Alexandra Farkouh

FOURTH CIRCUIT
Chesapeake Ranch Water Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 401 F.3d 274 (4th
Cir. 2005) (holding: (1) the Le-Ax Lest applicable to determine whether
an association provided or made water service available for purposes of
section 1926(b) of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act;
(2) tapping into an aquifer, even in a way that impairs a water associations ability to provide service, is not an infringement under section
1926(b); and (3) occasionally providing service outside a franchise
area, by itself, does not expand the franchise area).
The Chesapeake Ranch Water Company ("Chesapeake"), a nonprofit water association, provided water services in Calvert County,
Maryland. On three prior occasions the Board of Commissioners of
Calvert County, Maryland ("County") granted Chesapeake's applications for expansion of its service franchise area to accommodate new
developments. The controversy in this case arose when the County rejected Chesapeake's formal offer to provide water service to two new
developments adjacent to, but not within, Chesapeake's existing franchise area. Instead, the County resolved to extend County-owned water
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facilities to provide service to the new developments. Chesapeake sued
the County seeking protection under section 1926(b) of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act of 1961 ("CFRDA"). The
United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment in favor of the County, and Chesapeake appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Chesapeake argued summaryjudgment was inappropriate for three
reasons. First, the County service to the new developments limited or
curtailed Chesapeake's service by invading a location where Chesapeake provided service. Second, the County's plan to tap the aquifer
from which Chesapeake presently drew its water supply limited or curtailed Chesapeake's ability to serve its existing franchise area. Lastly,
Chesapeake maintained issues of material fact existed as to the precise
scope of Chesapeake's franchise area.
In upholding the district court's decision, the court first examined
the legislative history of section 1926(b) of the CFRDA, finding it prohibited the curtailment or limitation of service provided or made available by a qualifying non-profit water association by inclusion of any
municipal corporation or other public body. The statute only protected the association in the area in which the association provided or
made water service available. Moreover, the court adopted the threepart, Le-Ax test articulated by the Sixth Circuit that requires an association to demonstrate (1) it is capable of servicing the disputed area, (2)
has a legal right under state law to do so, and (3) the disputed area is
within the geographic boundaries of the associations existing franchise
area.
The court then examined each of Chesapeake's claims, ruling on
the first claim that Chesapeake was not entitled to protection under
section 1926(b) of the CFRDA because the new developments were not
within the geographic boundaries of Chesapeake's existing franchise
area. With regard to the second claim, the court found that even if the
County tapped into an aquifer in a manner that impaired Chesapeake's ability to provide service, such an action would not constitute
an infringement under the statute. Finally, as to the scope of Chesapeake's franchise area, the court found that although Chesapeake previously provided service to customers outside of its franchise area, such
action by itself, did not expand the scope of the franchise area. Only
the County had authority to expand the scope of the franchise area.
Thus, because the County had not expanded the geographic boundaries of Chesapeake's franchise area to include the new developments,
and because tapping an aquifer in a way that impaired Chesapeake's
ability to provide service was not an infringing action under section
1926(b), the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the County.
CharlesP. Kersch, Jr.

